A coup is also made of probabilities

The coup was planned meticulously. As Garcia dos Santos explains, "it was a classic operation mounted with all the 'f's and 'r's, order of operations, transmission attachments, hours, codes, passwords, everything was prepared".

Despite being committed and motivated, not all the captains had the same confidence in the success of the military coup. At one point, Otelo was discussing the details of the operation with Vítor Alves, and he asked: "Otelo, what is the probability of success that you see for this?"

Otelo replied: "Success? Success? 80%!"

Vítor Alves was enthusiastic about the answer: "Wow! If you had told me 20% I would have been very excited, you say 80%, I'm relieved."

Vítor Crespo, on the other hand, was resolutely aligned with the process, believing in the cause, not in the success of the coup. "I took my family out of the house, put them in a friend's house, because I was convinced that there was a greater than 50% chance of failure than success."

Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho was surprised by this confidence of Admiral Vítor Crespo and even thought he had misheard: "To fail, Vítor?"

Vítor Crespo clarifies and even gives more details about his expectations at the time: "Yes. I came here convinced that I would be arrested, and all those consequences..."

"Portugal and the Future" decided while the traffic light was not opening

The launch of António de Spínola's book, "Portugal and the Future" -- a decisive episode in triggering the events that led to the coup -- was decided in a conversation between Otelo and the general, while they were waiting for the light to open. Days before the publication of the famous book, Otelo was going down Rua do Telhal and, at the traffic light that connects to Rua de São José, he hears a horn. The light is red.

"I turn around and see the general's Mercedes, which is behind, with the driver. Spínola rolled down the window and said: 'Otelo, come here'. I went to him and said: So, my general, what's up? 'Hey, do you want to know something? Marcello won't let me publish the book', says Spínola.

"But which book, my general? The one in which my general points out a way out of the colonial war, the Overseas? 'That's the one, man! I have the whole book ready, I presented it to Marcello, he read it, he says he won't authorize me to publish it'. So, my general, are you going to publish it or not? 'I can't publish it!' So why? 'Because Marcello says that if he publishes it, he will resign!'".

Otelo, who is incredulous, insists: "But my general, that's what we want, dammit! Go for it, publish it now! 'No, no, I'm a general officer, I will never do anything to overthrow the Government of my country'. Spínola's contradictions", said Otelo, who did not give up: "But, my general, don't worry about that. I guarantee you that Professor Marcello Caetano will not resign, for sure. Or, if he resigns, he will not be dismissed. So, publish the book, the MFA is with you".

"'Are you with me?', asked the general. 'Yes, sir', said Spínola, and off he went", Otelo said, 40 years later, with incredible precision, as if the dialogue had taken place the day before.

A week later the book appeared on the shelves. It was a "resounding success". The opposition "clung to the book like a bible". "Bestial. But this led to the dismissal of the two generals", recalls Otelo.

Spínola's 'generosity'

When Caetano surrendered, General Spínola offered to be the one to receive power from the President of the Council. By phone, he asks Otelo: "How does Otelo want to do it? Will Otelo go there, send someone for him or does he want me to carry out this mission?"

Hesitant, he covered the mouthpiece and asked Vítor Alves: "Should we send the general?" Vítor Alves replies: "Of course, he will be part of the Junta de Salvação Nacional".

Otelo replied to Spínola: "Ready, my general, consider yourself authorized to go to Carmo to receive power."

And the first stone in the shoe

The first discomfort with Spínola came shortly after Marcello's surrender, when the military from March 16, who were in Trafaria, were released. Sanches Osório says that the general with the monocle made a speech to the military and at one point says:

"'You played a remarkable role', as if to say: this is mine from now on -- lieutenant-colonel Bruno, write down the names of these military, they will all be promoted".

And that's when Admiral Vítor Crespo says: "Wait a minute, go down there, wait, because there are still things to be resolved here, it's not like that."

Vítor Crespo remembers the moment well and recalls that Fisher Lopes Pires was quick to make things clear: "'Nobody is promoted here, my general'. As if to say: 'Get out of here, because we are still in command here'".

Why the coup on April 25

After the failure of March 16, Otelo realizes that he cannot let the MFA die and the coup must be put into action quickly.

The regime was convinced that March 16 -- the failed coup from Caldas da Rainha right after the dismissal of generals Spínola and Costa Gomes -- was a Spínolist maneuver and that it had been defeated. "That gave peace of mind", explains Otelo.

It was Marques Júnior who, at a meeting of officers on the 24th, promoted by Otelo to explain the failure of March 16, put the question to Otelo: "When do you expect the operation to be launched?"

And the reasoning was very simple: "It has to be in the last week of April. At most in the week that starts on the 22nd until the 26th, Friday, because it has to be on weekdays. Otherwise, the staff will go on the weekend and the units will be empty", explains Otelo. So, it had to be on the 23rd, 24th or 25th of April. And why?

"Because our comrades are in prison and the PIDE, after hunting down the communists and leftists of the MRPP who are out there graffitiing the walls -- 'May 1st is red, death to fascism' -- will all be put away, those that the PIDE can catch, and then the PIDE will start pulling the strings on our comrades who are in prison. And then the movement will fade away, it will be gone."

The date also coincided with a NATO exercise on the Tagus River in Lisbon. Vítor Crespo, an admiral in the Navy, knew that the NATO fleet was moving in the early hours of the April 25 operations. Therefore, the captains discussed whether that day was advantageous.

"It was still a powerful fleet, in which we had a ship. But we concluded among ourselves that it was not at all likely that in a revolution in Portugal the NATO fleet, having no proper information on the matter, would intervene. And therefore, what was likely, yes, is that it would be a deterrent to a pact we had with Spain, a military pact that could be called upon to act if Spain agreed", explained the admiral.

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